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ABSTRACT 
The overall economy in China was overheated in the 
first half of 1993. Speculative activities w e r e tremendous 
and affected the welfare of the whole p o p u l a t i o n . In July 
3, 1993, Central Government announced the Austerity 
Measures to correct the situation. We define the period 
from July 3 to the fourth quarter of 1993 as Stage I of 
Austerity M e a s u r e s . An immediate effect was achieved with 
land prices dropping by 80% in some small c i t i e s . Once 
inflation was under control, China turned its attention to ..-—- — . — _^  -
restoring economic growth. With the announcement of Deng 
Xiao Ping's loosening of control, most of the measures came 
to be ignored. The recent promulgation of the capital gain 
tax represented Stage 工工 of Austerity M e a s u r e s . Different 
effect were felt by developers and investors in both 
stages. Potential countermoves were identified to bypass 
the changes created. This project concentrates on the PRC 
property market for overseas sales. The fate of the 
Austerity Measures illustrates the weakness of central 
government in executing central p o l i c i e s . 
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Scope of the Project 
This project aims at examining the problems of the 
current PRC property markets, evaluating the effect of the 
Austerity M e a s u r e s , and identifying the potential 
turnaround from an investor's point of view. The investors 
here represent developers who develop property for overseas 
b u y e r s , This project does not cover local property 
developers. 
The development of the Austerity Measures from July 
1993 to the present serves to illustrate the weaknesses in 
overall administration in central government policies. 
There is a famous proverb: government delegates power to 
p r o v i n c i a l governments (decentralization) in achieving some 
pre-set objectives, delegation leads to chaos including 
inflation and unrest. When chaos exists, central 
government re-asserts (recentralization) control to ensure 
political stability. When recentralization begins 
executed, growth of pre-set objectives slows down and 
diminishes. When central government re-assumes stability, 
it delegates power again to stimulate growth. 
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This cycle keeps on repeating in r e c e n t Chinese 
h i s t o r y . The original purpose of the Austerity M e a s u r e s is 
to control the overheated economy. When economic growth 
slows d o w n , the central government is afraid to lose 
p r o s p e r i t y , and Deng Xiao Ping permits looser control in 
the fourth quarter of 1993 to ensure the continuous 
economic g r o w t h . The development of the Austerity Measures 
reported in this project proves the accuracy of the above 
p r o v e r b . More generally our p r o j e c t serves to illustrate 
the u n i q u e difficulties of moving toward a m a r k e t economy 
in China where the central government lacks the information 
and the institutional structure to impose its w i l l on local 
authorities, yet m u s t attempt to do so in order to hold the 
country t o g e t h e r . 
Background 
The People's Republic of China is the w o r l d ' s third— 
largest country. Over 80% of the population is 
concentrated in the eastern half of the country, especially 
in the north-east, near the coast or in the major river 
basins. 
A new era began in the 1970s when President Richard 
Nixon of the United States of America made a historic visit 
to China in 1972, thus ending Beijing's isolation from the 
non-communist w o r l d , and leading to the adoption of an 
economic "Open Door" policy. Diplomatic and trade 
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relations were established with the USA and subsequently, 
with Western European countries, Japan and other Asian 
n a t i o n s . 
The years 1979 to 1991 saw the longest period of 
strong growth since 194 9; average annual gross national 
p r o d u c t (GNP) increased by 8.6% in real t e r m s . The "Open 
Door" policy included the implementation of the many 
r e f o r m s . High economic growth, diversification of the 
forms of ownership, and fewer restrictions on labour 
mobility have all contributed to greater job opportunities. 
The official urban unemployment rate dropped from over 5% 
in 1979 to 2% in 1984, and remained below that level until 
1989 when it increased to 2.6%, Since 1978, the highest 
GNP growth rate has been the 14.6% reached in 1984, and the 
lowest the 3.9% registered in 1989, with average annual 
growth rate of 8.8% during the 1981-91 p e r i o d . GNP (at 
current prices) increased from RMB 1,592 billion in 1989 to 
RMB 1,767 billion in 1990, and to RMB 1,958 billion in 
1991.1 
In the 90s, the economic cycle in Mainland China is at 
a turning point. As mentioned, the economy in China has 
developed in a fabulous w a y , but has overheated. Symptoms 
include high inflation, unbalanced distribution of 
financial resources, panic buying, and lack of hard cash in 
^ "The HSBC Group: Business Profile Series - China" The Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited. Tenth Edition, February 1993. 
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the banking s y s t e m . A sustained period of high inflation 
began in 1985 when retail prices increased by 8.8%; the 
rate rose to 18.5% in 1988 and 17.8% in 1989. For example, 
Shanghai increased prices in early July 1993 for everything 
from bus tickets to coal, with a monthly pass rising from 
12 to 20 y u a n , and coal from 15.5 to 23 yuan for 100 
kilograms,2 ranging from 40 to 70% increase. The 
overheating economy was fuelled pirimairily by expansionary 
fiscal p o l i c i e s , rapid decentralisation, growing 
investment/speculation, and relaxation of price controls. 
Birth of Austerity Measures 
The overheating economy created both economic and 
social p r o b l e m s . Government revenue dropped as a result of 
the decentralisation required by enterprise r e f o r m , while 
expenditure increased as price subsidies were raised to 
support new rural programs. The Government succeeded in 
containing the deficit for seven years continuously. Over 
the y e a r s , debt financing (both domestic and foreign) of 
the deficit has increased. "The budget deficit reached 
23 . 66 billion yuan (US$4.12 billion) in 1992, or 2.88 
billion yuan (US$501 million) more than planned", addressed 
by Finance Minister I^iu Zhongli.3 The deficit caused great 
2 
"Shanghai Increases Prices in Battle against Inflation". South China 
Morning Post. July 2, 1993. 
^"Warning on HK'S Economy". South China Morning Post. June 29, 1993. 
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financial difficulties in Central Government and delayed 
necessary infrastructure construction in underdeveloped 
states and cities. 
On the other h a n d , economic growth was concentrated 
along the coastal areas, the Special Economic Zone (SEZ), 
and the north-east including Beijing and Shanghai. 
Inhabitants in the north-west rural areas suffered all 
kinds of economic problems created by the overheating 
economy with salary increased substantially below the rate 
of inflation. Their living standards dropped t r e m e n d o u s l y . 
The farm crisis grew as peasants fight for p a y m e n t for 
their crops, attacking post offices in 11 p r o v i n c e s which 
failed to cash postal remittances, when officials diverted 
agricultural funds to speculate in the real estate and 
stock m a r k e t s . Farmers remaining in the rural areas became 
increasingly restless. Whereas a lot of people rushed to 
SEZ, hoping to find a job and enjoy the benefits of 
economic growth. All these created social problems and 
grievances within the population. 
工七 also cr^ajed pressure to the p_roperty.. m a r k e t in 七he 
areas due to the intensified land supply and demand 
condition. Foreign investments drove up demand in land for . 、 ---…- --‘…- —--… 1.— — ^ 
factory site. Developers invested in property projects to -— . 
accommodate the expected increasing population, both from 
Hong Kong and Mainland China. Land p r i c e s , cost of 
building materials and workers salaries were increased in 
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an u n c o n t r o l l a b l e m a n n e r . The overheating property market 
and the high inflation in land price further intensified 
social p r o b l e m s within the p o p u l a t i o n . 
The resulting economic and social chaos, according to 
Qiao Shi, Standing Committee member and chairman of the 
National People's Congress (NPC), are "the problems of 
blind expansion of investment, the contest of speed and the 
lack of an effective regulatory mechanism have not been 
properly solved."4 An effective macro regulatory and 
supervisory system needed under the new m a r k e t economic 
structure had yet to be set up. In July 2 , 1993, China 
appointed Executive Vice—Premier Zhu Rongji to head the 
( 
People‘ 
s B3.nk of Chins, signalling the intirodiiction of 
tough measures to restore fiscal order, to strengthen the 
leadership of the State Council over financial w o r k . In 
July 3, 1993, Zhu Rongji delivered a 16-points plan aimed 
at 1) controlling the country's inflation, 2) recovering 
the bank loans, 3) restricting the offer of credit, 4) 
redirecting investment, 5) restricting land supply, and 6) 
•— — 
• _ _ _ 
regulating the property market. In order to obtain 
results, the central government has attached considerable 
importance to the following austerity measures which have 
been grouped into four categories, based on the applicable 
sector:- 5 
4 
"Zhu Takes Helm of the State Bank". South China Morning Post. July 3, 
1993. 
5 "The Austerity Measures". South China Morning Post. July 4, 1993. 
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Financial 
1. Further increase deposit and lending interest rates; 
2. Call in loans diverted to speculative schemes; 
3. Force non-financial institutions to repay funds 
borrowed from financial institutions/ 
4. Force banks to control the way they approve loans; 
5. Strengthen the Central Bank; 
6. Control listing of shares on the stock m a r k e t . 
Investment/Property 
7. End dubious fund-raising schemes; 
8. Control real estate fever in development zones; 
9. R e d u c e the scale of infrastructure p r o j e c t s . 
G o v e r n m e n t 
10. Ensure purchase of all government bonds by mid-July; 
11. Cut government spending by 20% and ban the importation 
of cars; 
12. Send inspection teams to ensure that p r o v i n c e s obey 
o r d e r s . 
Others 
13. Forbid the issuing of new I〇Us to peasants; 
14. Suspend price reform measures; 
15. Reform the export financing system; 
16. Clear transport bottlenecks that allow goods to pile 
u p . 
Of the above 16 points, the measures in financial 
sector and especially in the investment/property sector 
have an impact on property m a r k e t development. W e will 
elaborate details in Chapter 3. 
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Aftermath 
During the fourth quarter of 1993, the overheating 
economy and inflation were partially under c o n t r o l . In 
view of the prosperity in China's economy compared to the 
deteriorating one in the western w o r l d , Deng Xiao Ping 
considered it a golden opportunity to strengthen China's 
economy and political power in the international theatre. 
T h u s , Deng would like to loosen the Austerity Measures to 
allow the fabulous growth to c o n t i n u e . The loosening of 
the A u s t e r i t y Measures created new effects on the property 





Marketing Situation Analysis 
In our study of examining the problems of the current 
PRC property m a r k e t , we firstly must h a v e a better 
understanding of the historical background of PRC property 
m a r k e t and the socio-economic factors affecting the 
d e v e l o p m e n t of this m a r k e t . T h e n , we analyze both demand 
and supply on the m a r k e t . Concentrating on the d e v e l o p e r s ' 
point of v i e w , we examine the impact of austerity measures 
on m a r k e t sentiments. A forecast on the future supply is 
made based on qualitative analysis of the data collected. 
Primary Data Collection 
Sources of secondary data available in China is not 
easily a c c e s s i b l e . We concentrate our effort on collecting 
primary d a t a . Interviews with representatives from 
developers who have worked in the PRC property m a r k e t in 
recent years were conducted. The information collected is 
mainly f iroin theiiT diirect expeirience and. pirof essional 
opinion on the PRC property m a r k e t . 
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In a d d i t i o n , property agents such as Land Power, 
Centraline are also playing an active role in PRC property 
m a r k e t though agents in the PRC property m a r k e t are not 
w i d e l y employed at the m o m e n t . Therefore, interviews with 
property agents are also conducted in order to have a more 
objective point of view from them and a m o r e professional 
forecast on the PRC property m a r k e t . 
Secondary Data Collection 
Although the PRC property market has expanded in 
recent y e a r s , it is not yet a mature m a r k e t . Information 
from secondary sources, especially from C h i n a , is scarce 
and is not w e l l organized enough for us to have a 
systematic analysis. Our effort is therefore concentrated 
on collecting information from newspapers and journals in 
Hong Kong which have a keen interest on PRC property 
m a r k e t . 
M o r e o v e r , the PRC property market is a very dynamic 
one which is partly explained by the overheated economy. 
An eye on the daily news can surely help us to have more 
updated information about the m a r k e t . It also gives a more 
objective way to analyze this property m a r k e t . 
Data Analysis 
After collecting all the information from both primary 
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and secondary sources, data is analyzed with qualitative 
approach but in an objective w a y . Problems of current PRC 
property m a r k e t are identified and impact on developers are 
e v a l u a t e d . Countermoves by developers to overcome the 
p r e s e n t d i f f i c u l t situation are also examined. 
Limitations & Obstacles 
The title of this project is a very current issue and 
hot topic at the m o m e n t . Both the central and local 
policies change all the time. The market itself is also 
very d y n a m i c . These create a lot of difficulties during 
our process of collecting information. We have to always 
keep a very close eye on all current development of the 
m a r k e t . 
In addition, PRC is a very large m a r k e t with an 
extensive area. Different areas have their own unique 
characteristics. Different local governments have 
different p o l i c i e s . These factors shape d i f f e r e n t market 
features. Characteristics and prospects of one market in 
the North may be completely different from that in the 
South. A generalized perception of the PRC m a r k e t is 
difficult to conclude. 
M o r e o v e r , it is not an uncommon problem that 
statistics is hard to get from either public bodies and 
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r e l e v a n t departments or private organizations in PRC when 
w e h a v e research on PRC issues. Statistics figures are 
always treated top confidential in PRC. S o m e t i m e s , even 
you have the access to the relevant d e p a r t m e n t s , the 
figures are o u t d a t e d . Thus, it is not suitable to use in 
a t o p i c which is so hot and current. We can only rely on 
the statistics compiled and provided by the professional 
bodies in Hong K o n g . 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE AUSTERITY MEASURES 
Details of A u s t e r i t y Measures in Property Sector 
M r . Zhu Rongji specified detail rules and regulations 
for each point in the austerity m e a s u r e s . Limited by the 
scope of this p r o j e c t , we will concentrate on details in 
investment/property sector:- ^ 
A . Restriction in private land sales. Central government 
recentralizes the power from province/county/city in 
allocating/selling lands. 
B . Majority of lands are allocated/sold under public 
auction, centralized under appointed legal entities. 
Land can be sold in public auction only when city 
planning for the land has been finalised. There are 
six usage of lands which are not allowed to be sold in 
auction. Land cannot be auctioned if: 
- u s a g e is not aligned with national p r o d u c t i o n 
policies； 
一 the purpose of the development project is not yet 
"Chinese Government Investigate Property Market Sc Control Land Supply". 
Wen Wei Po. July 13, 1993. & "Shenzhen Issues New Measures in Realty Market 
Control Beneficial to Long Term Development". Express. August 7, 1993. 
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decided; 
一 the amount of investment is not yet finalised/ 
一 u s a g e is not aligned with the principle of 
p r o t e c t i n g farmlands 
一 u s a g e is not aligned with the unified land 
allocation/selling principle 
- l a n d d e v e l o p m e n t requirements are not respected 
C. Suspend the licence of companies w h o s e principal 
activity is only land speculation, with no actual 
c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
D . Reconsider the architecture of existing land 
c o n s t r u c t i o n . Government encourages constructions in 
m u l t i - s t o r a g e building and lower class h o u s i n g . 
Feasibility studies on the above constructions have to 
be seriously carried out. 
E. Developer has to pay 5-10% as deposit upon signing of 
land contract, while the rest of the land cost is to 
be paid within 60 days. 
F. The land cannot be transferred unless 20% of total 
investment (excluding land cost) and construction area 
are completed. Tax is charged on land appreciation 
value when transfer taken place. 
G . A minimum development fund of 25% is to be injected 
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before p r e - s a l e can be carried out. 
H . Strengthen tax collection procedure to m i n i m i z e 
d e f a u l t p a y m e n t . 
The above details of austerity m e a s u r e s being 
initially announced in July 3 have substantial impacts on 
future property m a r k e t development in China. 
Iirmiediate Impact of Austerity M e a s u r e s 
A f t e r the implementation of Austerity Measures in 
J u l y , the overheating economy, particularly in the finance 
and property sector, was partially under control. 
Liquidity problems in Capital Market were lessened; 
deposits substantially increased whereas a portion of 
dubious loans were recovered. Land price in large cities 
dropped a little, e.g. <10%, but dropped by 20 to 80% in 
small t o w n s . Whereas flat price remained stable in large 
cities, but dropped by 10 to 50% in small towns (refers to 
Table 1) . Both purchase prices for land and flat in 
smaller towns have been dropped in a larger rate due to the 
effect of the Austerity Measures in curbing the overheated 
economy. Before the issue of the m e a s u r e s , speculations in 
property market were serious. The enthusiasm of the 
speculators blinded them to the unreasonable high price,-
prices for land and flats were driven up in whatever 
locations they can purchased. However, when the measures 
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w e r e introduced, speculators were afraid that the 
t i g h t e n i n g control would lead to diminishing growth in 
p r o p e r t y m a r k e t , as history has demonstrated the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of above occurrence. In large cities 
p a r t i c u l a r l y in northern China, actual demands from 
expatriates of foreign subsidiaries and representative 
offices e x i s t e d . Therefore, price only adjusted in a small 
scale during this period. Whereas most of the demand for 
small towns in southern China were arisen from speculators. 
When speculators were hesitated about the p o t e n t i a l effect 
of the measures and stop pouring money into property 
m a r k e t , m a r k e t price slumped. 
The mentioned price drop can substantiate the 
immediate tightening effect of the austerity m e a s u r e s . At 
this stage, a lot of observers predict that a substantial 
portion can be sustainable as the execution of the measures 
affect future revenue in Central Government. Measures 
which are expected to persist include regulations on land 
auction, building resales, taxation issues, and 
restrictions of provincial power in private land private. 
By centralising land auction in one unified legal entity 
and restricting provincial power in private land sales, 
Central Government can ensure an income flow. By enforcing 
the 25% completion rule for building p r e — s a l e s , the 
government can minimize potential social grievances due to 
default. Taxation rules have to be observed; this is one 
of the most important sources of government income. 
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Table 1 
Purchase Price Decrease for Selected Cities (in real term 
after adjusting inflation rate) 
Cities Flats Land 
Beijing stable stable 
Shanghai stable stable 
Guangzhou 5% 5% 
Shenzhen 10% 10% — — 
j … — - … ― — 一 . _ _ 
Suzhou 10% 20%' 
Dongguan 15-20% 20% 
Zhuhai 20% 20% 
Shantou 20% 30% 
Huizhou 20% 30% 
Hainan 20-30% 30% 
DaiyaBay 40% 30-80% 
Beihai 50% 30-90% 
Source: interview with Mr. Sherman Lai of Centraline Limited 
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From a macro v i e w p o i n t , China is now being seen as one 
of the m o s t important economic centres in the n e x t d e c a d e , 
Its w e s t e r n c o u n t e r p a r t s , including US, UK and J a p a n , all 
pay close attention to China,s activities- In order to 
p a r t i c i p a t e in the international theatre and communicate in 
an efficient w a y , we expect that China will be 
"westernized" in some aspects. As increasing portion of 
the rules and regulations will be codified, and enforced, 
if not a l l . From a micro viewpoint, China, under the 
guidance of Deng Xiao Ping, is m o v i n g towards 
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . As mentioned, the decentralization 
carried out in the 80s created all kinds of chaos 一 
loosening central control, high inflation, rural unrest, 
and u n c o n t r o l l a b l e local authorities. The Recentralization 
ensures one important element: the Central Government is 
re-asserting control on major aspects including revenue 
earnings and central control. Accordingly, observers 
expect the rules w i l l be sustained in a longer time frame 
due to its importance for government revenue. 
During the fourth quarter of 1993, overheating economy 
and inflation are partially under control. H o w e v e r , in 
view of the prosperity in China economy compared to the 
deteriorating one in western w o r l d , Deng considers it a 
golden opportunity to strengthen the China economy and 
political p o w e r . T h u s , Deng would like to loosen the 
Austerity Measures for the fabulous growth. 
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From the fourth quarter of 1993 onwards, despite the 
view of the o b s e r v e r s , austerity measures are almost fully 
faded out from the p i c t u r e . The most recent development 
are the announcement from the National Land M a n a g e m e n t 
Bureau to impose the capital gain t a x . H o w e v e r , Central 
G o v e r n m e n t faces severe protest in actual e x e c u t i o n . The 
impact of the second stage of the Austerity M e a s u r e s will 
be examined in details in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES 
General Situation 
In C h i n a , central g o v e r n m e n t usually issues central 
p o l i c i e s to set the major direction which the p r o v i n c e s or 
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s have to follow. This only stipulates the 
t h i n k i n g of central g o v e r n m e n t . It allows the local 
p r o v i n c i a l g o v e r n m e n t to state clearly w h a t should be 
imposed and details of the new p o l i c y . Local p r o v i n c i a l 
g o v e r n m e n t can adjust policies according to the local 
s i t u a t i o n . When the issue is down to m u n i c i p a l or county 
levels, local g o v e r n m e n t can still have their own local 
adjustment and degree of implementation. S o m e t i m e s , they 
implement but with other countermoves to balance the effect 
of implementing this central p o l i c y . 
Narrowing our review in property sector, each county 
has its own local department for property ownership 
r e g i s t r a t i o n , sales and re-sales. However, information is 
not open to p u b l i c , general public are not allowed to 
assess to the d e t a i l s . There are no central administrative 
d e p a r t m e n t to consolidate all registration information from 
individual county, m u n i c i p a l or p r o v i n c e . Information are 
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scattered in the hands of local authorities o n l y . Due to 
the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e shortfall, central g o v e r n m e n t has 
d i f f i c u l t i e s in enforcing the actual carry out of any 
central policy in provincial level. As a r e s u l t , local 
g o v e r n m e n t attitudes play a very important role in 
assessing the impact of austerity m e a s u r e s . We would like 
to examine it in m o r e details by geographical location. 
Northern China 
Local government in Northern China e . g . Shanghai 
usually follow closely the policy of central g o v e r n m e n t . 
They do carry out the austerity measures. H o w e v e r , they 
also closely monitor the change in central government 
attitude which may induce a change in central p o l i c y . They 
try to formulate strategies in advance so that they can 
take appropriate action to adapt to the dynamic 
e n v i r o n m e n t . 
Southern China 
Local government in Southern China usually have more 
autonomy than the Northern China government because most of 
them develop their economy earlier e.g. Guangdong Province 
and with longer history of attracting foreign capital. 
They have a better understanding of the foreign world and 
seem to be more flexible in accepting foreign ideas and 
p r a c t i c e s . In addition, different local governments in 
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this regions have keen competition among themselves in 
attracting foreign capital for their provincial 
d e v e l o p m e n t . 
Due to their flexibility and keen competition, they 
often h a v e adjustment on the austerity measures issued by-
central g o v e r n m e n t . For instance, the Mayor of Guangzhou 
M u n i c i p a l i t y has declared that it will not impose the 
capital gain tax on property transaction of Guangzhou, 
Though this is a temporary measure of the Guangzhou 
g o v e r n m e n t , it still gives the chance for developers to 
react accordingly. 
H o w e v e r , the provincial government still have limitations 
on their authority and have to act with good justification. 
Remote Areas in China 
Local government in remote areas are very keen to 
attract foreign capital so that they have funds to develop 
and become rich. They usually offer very favourable terms 
to foreign investors in developing their local property 
m a r k e t . When austerity measures are imposed by central 
g o v e r n ment, some of local governments do implement them but 
they also create new incentives to compensate for the 
adverse effect on their property m a r k e t . This keeps their 
property market running and they can continue to attract 
foreign capital to facilitate their economic g r o w t h . 
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Central government though is aware of the situation, 
they still allow them to do so because they also understand 
the importance of foreign capital and property market to 
the p r o s p e r i t y of the local economy. 
M o r e o v e r , sharing information among different 
d e p a r t m e n t s or between different levels of goveirninents are 
rare in PRC. There is always conflict between t h e m . This 
m a k e s the control of central government over local 
g o v e r n m e n t s more difficult. Central g o v e r n m e n t may not 
know clearly about the details of sales of land by the 
local g o v e r n m e n t . As the share of information among 
different departments is also rare, collection of tax 
revenue becomes difficult. All these contribute to the 
less effectiveness of austerity measures and central 
c o n t r o l . 
In addition, the definition of obligations and 
authority of local government is v a g u e . When China started 
her open dooir p o l i c y , centira. 1 goveirnment favouired. economic 
growth locally because it is difficult to h a v e economic 
growth over an extensive area like China. This allowed 
flexibility to local governments to determine their own 
local policies especially along the coast. A historical 
background of vague definition and loose control attribute 
the austerity measures further unsuccessful. 
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C H A P T E R 5 
STAGE 工 - I M P A C T AND C O U N T E R M O V E 
F i r s t A u s t e r i t y M e a s u r e s 
F i r s t A u s t e r i t y M e a s u r e s refer to the p e r i o d starting 
from J u l y 3 with t h e first a n n o u n c e m e n t , and ending with 
Deng Xiao Ping p e r m i t t i n g the looser controls in the fourth 
q u a r t e r of 1993. The m e a s u r e s aimed at c o o l i n g down the 
o v e r h e a t e d e c o n o m y . Zhu R o n g j i expected the m e a s u r e would 
lead to reduction in supply and a c c o r d i n g l y p r o p e r t y p r i c e . 
C o n t r a r y to the western economy theory, p r i c e in China 
p r o p e r t y did not increase due to reduced s u p p l y , rather, 
demand slumped and p r i c e d r o p p e d . This was b e c a u s e most of 
d e m a n d , p a r t i c u l a r the one in small cities in Southern 
China w a s created by speculators but not a c t u a l u s e r s . 
T h e r e f o r e , when m e a s u r e s w e r e i n t r o d u c e d , _ _ s ^ e c u l ^ o r s held 
u p t h e fund a n g applied a "wait-and-see" s t r a t e g y . With no 一‘ -…-—— 
actual d e m a n d , reduced supply t h e r e f o r e did n o t drive up 
七he p r i c e . R a t h e r , the whole p r o p e r t y market looked gloomy 
� ^ 
with p r i c e s r e d u c e d . A number of observers togeth^~~^wi1:h 
portion of d e v e l o p e r s foreseen that part of the A u s t e r i t y 
M e a s u r e s can be p e r s i s t e d , if not all. A c c o r d i n g l y , 
p r o a c t i v e actions are t a k e n . 
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工即 a c t to the Property Market - Supply Side 
This section discuss the impact of austerity measures 
on the supply side of the property market in China forcing 
on d e v e l o p e r s who develop property for overseas buyers 
o n l y . 
a) Construction Cost 
U n l i k e the Hong Kong case, land cost does not 
constitute a big share in the development cost of 
construction project in China. Instead, the cost of 
construction m a t e r i a l and labour significantly affect the 
p r o j e c t costing. Before the austerity m e a s u r e , the rapid 
expansion of the China property market had pushed up 
construction costs which increased by 28% and 40% by the 
end 1992 and first half of 1993 respectively. 
With the announcement of the austerity m e a s u r e , the 
property market then entered into a cool down period. 
Since some development projects were slowed down or even 
forced to halt, such shrinkage in the demand side led to 
the immediate dropping of construction cost by around 3 0%.^ 
It is surely good news for those developers who still have 
the capability to continue their construction work under 
the austerity programme. On the other hand, we expect that 
the construction price will remain stable in the long run 
•7 "China Slows Down Property Loans". Oriental Daily News. July 25, 1993• 
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if the property boom does not return. This is also 
advantageous to the developers as they can m o r e accurately 
p r e d i c t and control their project costing as w e l l as their 
r e v e n u e . 
b) Capital 
Concerning capital, the immediate impact of the 
p r o g r a m m e is the turning off the tap of financial source 
for quite a lot of property d e v e l o p e r s . Those developers 
who previously relied on Chinese local banks as the major 
source of development funding could no longer get financial 
support since the bankers themselves have to collect 
previous dubious loans under central government 
instruction. In fact, the state council has given the 
instruction that no new fixed asset investment proj ects 
should be approved in second half of 1993. Similarly, 
joint ventures also failed to obtain cash from PRC 
p a r t n e r s . An even worse situation faces those developers 
who have not yet started their p r o j e c t s . Under the central 
g o v e r n m e n t instruction, pre-sale can be carried out to 
obtain cash from the market only when the construction is 
25% completed. So, some developers may be driven out of 
the m a r k e t due to their inability to obtain necessary 
capital to sustain existing or start new project 
d e v e l o p m e n t . 
T h erefore, the capital cost in long run is expected to 
be increased and developers must have stronger financial 
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backup before they can start a p r o j e c t . M o r e o v e r , it will 
be r e l a t i v e l y difficult to obtain finance from banks unless 
official approval has been obtained b e f o r e h a n d . This 
action screens out the developers without a strong 
financial b a c k g r o u n d . This helps to ensure that the future 
PRC property m a r k e t will develop in a healthy direction. 
c) Land supply 
One immediate action in the austerity programme was 
the re-assessment of the development projects and 
developers by Chinese officials. Those lands which have 
not been developed within 2 years time would be 
r e p o s s e s s e d . It is clear that concerned developers would 
be severely h u r t . Some developers may even w a n t to quit 
the game and search for someone to take over the 
project/site at a cut throat p r i c e . At the same time, land 
cost dropped tremendously in some cities, especially in 
those rural areas like Hainan (30%), DaiyaBay (30-80%).^ 
Though the measures are bad news for those developers who 
could not continue the game, golden opportunities in fact 
have been created for financially strong and optimistic 
players who can take over land/site/project with good 
potential at relatively cheap p r i c e s . 
In the long run, the authority of local governments to 
sell land was restricted and the supply of new land is 
g 
"Some Sites in Daiya Bay Cut Price for Sales" . Sing Tao Jih Pao. July 31, 
1993. 
28 
expected to d e c r e a s e . The authority has estimated that 
r e v e n u e generated by selling land through tender/auction 
w o u l d reach 100 billion yuan in 1994, more than double as 
compared with 1993. To property developers, land cost will 
increase in the future. 
d) Competition 
In the short run, developers will face severe 
competition for finance from the market for survival. 
A c c o m p a n y i n g the selling of the completed construction will 
be attractive terms like price cut, lucky d r a w , gift 
g i v i n g , extended payment terms, etc. 
But in the long run, we consider that competition will 
lessen since many unqualified developers will be knocked 
out from the m a r k e t . 
e) Tax and profit 
To cope with central instruction, unauthorized tax 
benefits by local authority is expected to reduce 
significantly in the long run and thus the prof it margin of 
property developers will be cut down. Land speculation 
activities will also slow down due to the enforcement of 
capital appreciation tax. 
If the Chinese government determines to help people 
who have difficulty in getting accommodation and continue 
to require each developer to sell a certain fraction of 
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completed construction (around 10-20%) at a cost-based 
p r i c e , the profit margin of developer w i l l also be 
adversely affected. 
f) Investment direction / strategy 
In the long run, developers need to plan more 
carefully and be m o r e sensitive to the direction of central 
p l a n n i n g . In fact, land w i l l only be sold to the 
d e v e l o p e r s if they have completed the preliminary design on 
the d e v e l o p m e n t . During project planning, developers 
should try to avoid going into m a r k e t with no clear demand 
(eg. high class hotels / villas in rural areas) or 
violating national policy. Instead, they should take 
central guideline into consideration and proceed with 
projects that are of high economic efficiency or which ease 
current bottlenecks in the system. 
Impact to the Property M a r k e t 一 Demand Side 
This section discuss the impact of austerity measures 
on the demand side of the property market in C h i n a . Demand 
side refers to overseas buyers. 
a) Mortgage availability 
- In m o s t of the economic system, the availability of 
bank m o r t g a g e has been the determining factor of the 
property m a r k e t . To some extent, this is also applicable 
in PRC property m a r k e t . Existing property price in China 
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are still considered to be inexpensive. A c c o r d i n g l y , a 
portion of foreign buyers can settle the amount in one lump 
sum w i t h o u t m o r t g a g e arrangement. However, there are still 
another portion of buyers that need to have mortgage 
a r r a n g e m e n t in order to purchase the p r o p e r t y . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , m o r t g a g e availability will have impact to 
parts of the b u y e r s . 
Property buyers are less likely to obtain finance as 
easily as in the p a s t . Banks, like Bank of East Asia 
which provides mortgages to Hong Kong buyers to purchase 
Chinese properties will also tighten their mortgage 
policies in view of the uncertainties ahead under the 
austerity m e a s u r e s . The demand of the overheated property 
m a r k e t w i l l fall temporarily. 
H o w e v e r , in the long run, when the overheated economy 
has cooled down and the PRC banks are accumulating enough 
funds, m o r t g a g e w i l l be more readily available to the 
p u b l i c . The foreign banks are also willing to go back into 
the m a r k e t if the PRC property market is becoming more 
regulated under the austerity m e a s u r e s . 
b) Mentality of Individual Purchasers 
The austerity measures aim at cooling down the 
overheated economy and controlling the inflation rate which 
is running above 20% in major cities. In the short run, 
economic growth are expected to be slow down during the 
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first A u s t e r i t y M e a s u r e s . Purchasing power of foreign 
buyers w i l l not be affected, but the uncertain economic 
condition w i l l p r e v e n t them from investing in PRC property 
m a r k e t . 
The outlook w i l l be more optimistic in the long run 
when the austerity measures are effective. In view of the 
o r i g i n a l purpose of the m e a s u r e s , the overall economic 
conditions w i l l be improved and the income of the general 
public w i l l grow in the real terms when the economy can 
sustain healthy growth. When overseas investors resume 
optimistic view in China's future economy, demand will 
return and increase again. 
c) Investment Funds from Institutional Investors 
The booming property market does not only attract 
private b u y e r s , but also attract institutional investors 
from w i t h i n PRC and overseas. One of the purpose of 
austerity measures are to stop the inflow of h o t money in 
the property m a r k e t . In fact, the Chinese Central 
G o v e r n m e n t has announced the law to p r o h i b i t cross 
p r o v i n c i a l investment funds to speculate in property. 
During the initial phase of the Measures, investment fund 
activity is expected to reduce. 
In the long run, if the market can be more healthy and 
r e g u l a t e d , overseas investment will certainly be 
interested to invest in the PRC property m a r k e t . 
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Countermoves by Developers 
The austerity measures has hit the property market 
t r e m e n d o u s l y . The developers who are doing business in 
China have also suffered a tremendous blow. As m e n t i o n e d , 
we expect a portion of Austerity Measures, particular 
relating to finance sector, will be relaxed. Let us look 
at the countermoves of developers. 
a) Developers with funding capacity 
The austerity measure is regarded as having a cooling 
effect on the overheated economy by restricting the 
disorderly approval of capital loans. Therefore, the short 
term effect may have significant cooling effect on the 
property m a r k e t while in the long run, it is believed that 
the austerity measure would have a positive affect on the 
property m a r k e t . Having this in m i n d , the developers with 
funding capacity have the following countermoves:-
i) some developers may take advantage on this short term 
cooling down effect to cancel those projects which 
were blindly started up during the overheating period; 
ii) others may take this opportunity to purchase land and 
properties at a good price, especially at those areas 
w h e r e land and property prices drop tremendously; 
iii) Many major developers still maintain their optimistic 
view of the Chinese economy and property m a r k e t , and 
continue to put their eyes on large development in the 
construction of infrastructure such as railways, new 
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ports and highways, etc. For example, a recent report 
on newspaper indicates that Wharf Holding has an 
ambitious plan to turn the city of Wuhan into the 
"Chicago of China"; 
iv) developers arrange with banks in Hong Kong to provide 
mortgage to overseas buyers. Banks will study the 
financial background of the developers to decide if 
mortgage arrangement will be provided to buyers or 
n o t . To the banks, it is the developers being liable 
to any defaults or repayment rather than the buyers, 
although the developers can resume the property for 
re-sale if defaults do exist； ^ 
V) some developers like New World Development look for 
developing lower class housing for internal sale, but 
not look for large project in major cities for 
overseas sale. This type of investment has lower risk 
and guarantees a reasonable profit;“） 
vi) developers will still try to maintain good 
relationship with the Chinese officials and look for 
future long term investments. 
b) Developers without Fundincr Capacity 
Those developers without funding capacity were 
severely hit by the austerity measures. Here are some of 
the countermoves by developers without funding capacity. 
Q 
"Developers Consider Offering Mortgage Lending to Boost Sales". Hong Kong 
Economic Journal. July 26, 1993. 
World Withdraws from Beijing Project". Hong Kong Economic Journal. 
July 19, 1993. 
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i) Some developers may have to sell their land or 
prope r t i e s at once at a low price in order to recover 
the capital required 
ii) Some developers would reduce the scale of their 
d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m , hence reduce the capital 
required; 
iii) Some developers may try to increase their sales of 
prope r t i e s by advertising their sites in markets other 
than Hong K o n g , ie. Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia; 
iv) some developers would slow down the construction 
progress with only minimal work continuing, and at the 
same time look for a buyer. However, in order to 
fulfil the state policy, the new buyer has to fund the 
pro j e c t until 25% completion before legal title of the 
site can be transferred; 
V) some developers would divide the site into different 
ph a s e s , and construct one phase after another. They 
would start selling each phase when 25% is completed 
in order to fund the ongoing project; 
vi) some developers may try to get approval of ongoing 
project from officials through bribery. In such case, 
they may claim that the capital fund to be sufficient, 
or claim that the construction work is 25% completed 
when actually it is not; 
vii) some developers will change the usage of the building. 
For example, they may change a hotel development 
”"Small Realty Firms Forced to Sell". Sing Tao Jih Pao. July 19, 1993. 
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p r o j e c t to commercial building, so that they can sell 
individual units immediately to obtain capital; 
viii) some developers may find underwriter to underwrite 
future sales, while continuing to construct until 
c o m p l e t i o n . By using this m e t h o d , the developer will 
n o t be limited by the 25% completion r u l e , and can 
g u a r a n t e e income. However, the pre—requisite for this 
m e t h o d is that it only happens when two parties have 
d i f f e r e n t viewpoint on the property m a r k e t 一 the 
u n d e r w r i t e r considers the m a r k e t still being healthy 
and can sell at a good price while the developer 
considers the underwriting price is reasonable and 
foresees a downturn in the property market； 
ix) some developers may have to invite capital injection 
by increasing the number of shareholders. 
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CHAPTER 6 
STAGE 11 - IMPACT AND COUNTERMOVE 
Second Austerity Measures 
The National Land Management Bureau has openly 
announced the plan to impose the capital gain tax which is 
one of the local tax items since December 1992. Details 
would be formulated within one or two years. In September 
1993, it was announced that the ordinance of capital gain 
tax was approved by relevant departments in PRC but 
government was considering to exempt the capital gain from 
public auction in Shenzhen. Government finally on December 
10, 1993 announced the temporary measures of this capital 
gain tax effective on January 1, 1994 . Tax rate on capital 
gain ranges from 30% to 60%. This capital gain tax is the 
core of second austerity measure. 
This arouse vigorous response and strong opposition 
from developers, investors, agents solicitor firm and 
accounting firms in Hong Kong. Relevant associations in 
Hong Kong actively reflect their opinion towards this 
ordinance to central government in P R C . 
Some local government also responded that they would follow 
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this central policy but with flexibility to cope with their 
individual local r e q u i r e m e n t s . Moreover, the Secretary of 
Finance of PRC also promised to consider different opinions 
from Hong Kong regarding this issue. 
Contrary to the foreign observers' belief, almost the 
w h o l e austerity measures are no longer substantiable 
starting from 1994 onwards, except the new purposed capital 
gain tax r e g u l a t i o n . It is due to the belief of Deng Xiao 
Ping that China should expand the existing economy when 
western counterparts are now under severe recession. 
B e s i d e s , the resistance from local authorities in actual 
carry out of the austerity measures also fuel the 
administrative difficulties. T h u s , the second stage of 
austerity measures are dominated by the purposed capital 
gain tax regulation, with the previous measures gradually 
faded out from p i c t u r e . 
工即 a c t 
Impacts on Developers 
The m o s t seriously affected are those developers who 
have already signed the sales & purchase agreement with 
investors for their flats which are still under 
construction. It is because they cannot shift this burden 
to the investors as the price is already fixed. Developers 
of strong background afford to continue the project though 
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t h e p r o f i t is reduced or even becomes a loss w h i l e weaker 
d e v e l o p e r s may terminate the project though u n w i l l i n g l y . 
T h e new ordinance is not according to international 
p r a c t i c e . According to international p r a c t i c e , the new 
ordinance should not be applied to p r o j e c t s under 
construction or already started. In addition, tax rate is 
u s u a l l y reduced during the period of the p r o j e c t s . 
H o w e v e r , the new ordinance still applies to projects 
u n d e r w a y in PRC and there is no reduction of tax rate 
r e g a r d l e s s of the date the project was initiated. This 
reflects the strong determination of the central government 
to control the over-heated property market in C h i n a . 
The rate of return of developers is sharply reduced by 
3 0%, one of the accounting firms estimated. M o r e o v e r , the 
tax rate they are going to pay is estimated to range from 
53% to over 67% if their sales range from RMB 150 million 
to 500 m i l l i o n . Facing this difficulty, developers will be 
less interested in developing property market in PRC. 
Impact on Investors 
There is only minor impact on investors. Profile of 
investors are u n i q u e . They usually pay cash and need no 
m o r t g a g e . In addition, even they need to arrange mortgage, 
they arrange in Hong Kong. Moreover, most of them target 
for either long term or medium term investment. They aim 
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at retaining the value of their investment or hope to have 
an appreciation of their investment. They sometimes treat 
their property in PRC as resort house and live during their 
h o l i d a y s . 
In addition, it is more easy for them to escape from 
the t a x . They can split the total amount of the property 
into two portions, namely the price of the flat and price 
of furniture and fixtures. This will reduce the amount of 
the property and the investors will have less capital gain. 
Tax paid should be also sharply reduced. 
Impacts on Agents 
* 
A g e n t s will be adversely affected because the number 
of buildings or projects to be put for sale will be less. 
This directly affects their income. 
Counterinoves 
Countermoves of Developers 
Developers will probably reduce their investment in 
China's property market because the rate of return looks 
less attractive. For those developers who have already-
started the construction, they will try to sell their flats 
at a faked lower price to investors. Thus investors may 
not get the necessary mortgage loan amount from banks and 
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also they will suffer a higher capital gain tax in future 
w h e n they sell the flats. 
M o r e o v e r , developers may seek for more advantageous terms 
and conditions from local government when they negotiate to 
develop the area in order to compensate their reduced rate 
of return if this capital gain tax is really imposed, 
Countermoves of Investors 
Investors may ask developers to split the total amount 
of the flats into two portions, namely the flat and 
fixtures & furniture. Only the price of the flat is 
taxable w h i l e fixtures & furniture is not included in 七he 
capital gain tax. As a result, the capital gain is reduced 
by using this m e t h o d . 
Countermoves of Local Government 
Capital gain tax is actually one of the local tax 
items. Local government can determine the rate and how to 
implement. However, central government is still having 
heated debate with local government on this matter due to 
their strong determination to control the property m a r k e t . 
Some local government e.g. Guangzhou Major, has already 
announced that they would follow the central government's 
policy with appropriate flexibility so as to cope with 
their local investment environment. For instance, they can 
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p r o p e r l y impose this capital gain tax but reimburse part of 
the tax to the tax payer from their local finance. 
H o w e v e r , they have to justify this move by providing 
s u f f i c i e n t evidence to prove that they have to support this 




P r o p e r t y m a r k e t in China has been developed for a very 
short period of t i m e . It grows at a very fast p a c e . New 
p r o j e c t s or new building in some areas such as Shanghai and 
G u a n g z h o u are w e l c o m e by most investors. Supply always 
cannot m e e t the huge d e m a n d . However, this fast 
d e v e l o p m e n t creates some problems and m a k e s central 
g o v e r n m e n t lose control on it. Austerity m e a s u r e s do 
impose some a d j u s t m e n t , tighten credit c o n t r o l , restrict 
t r a n s a c t i o n of land and seriously examine the land usage 
a g r e e m e n t so that property development is put on the right 
track and in a healthy w a y . 
The w a v e of this property development started in early 
1992 after M r . Deng Xiao Ping's Southern 七our of China. 
The p r o p e r t y m a r k e t increased by 20% to 100% in terms of 
both transaction volume and p r i c e . Three m a j o r reasons 
c o n t r i b u t e to this fast development of the p r o p e r t y market 
in C h i n a . 
F i r s t l y , after the opening of China to the world, 
local enterprises expand very fast. Foreign investment is 
attracted by this brilliant growth and positively develop 
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this m a r k e t by injecting huge amount of capital into China. 
GNP growth of China is 12% in 1992 and regions along the 
coast far exceed this r a t e . The booming economic 
d e v e l o p m e n t stimulates the demand of new buildings. 
Property market is unavoidably boosted u p . 
Secondly, the property price in China is still below 
the m a r k e t though the economy develops so r a p i d l y . There 
is a very high potential of increasing in v a l u e . This 
attracts both local and foreign investors and increases the 
p r i c e of p r o p e r t y . 
Last but not the least, the strategic location of Hong 
Kong and her intimate relationship with China create a very 
favourable environment and keen interest for developers to 
explore this market of high potential. 
Though there are so many favourable factors affecting 
the growth of China's property m a r k e t , problems still exist 
in this rapid development. Over 70% of the approved land 
has not yet developed in 1992. Some developers are holding 
the land for speculation purpose or for controlling the 
supply quantity. The price thus rises up u n h e a l t h y . 
In addition, the laws and regulations related to 
property sales and purchase are not so properly laid down. 
I n v e s t ors' interest are not protected. The operation is 
not smooth and mature. There are laws and regulations but 
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in a messy w a y . Central government does impose some 
ordinances or system to control and manage the market but 
d i f f e r e n t local governments always have their own different 
p o l i c i e s . This confuses investors and allows scope for 
some developers to m a n o e u v r e . 
A s property development is a fast way to accumulate 
capital and gain profit, a lot of malpractice such as 
approval of land at unreasonably low price or out of their 
authorization limit appear. It wastes a lot of farmland 
and increase the price of construction material due to 
unlimited exploitation. 
A clear and w e l l organized laws and regulation become 
a m u s t . Central government has to formulate properly while 
local government should follow closely. Independent 
m o n i t o r i n g body is required. 
First austerity measures did have short term but 
immediate effect on the property market of China. It has 
a screening effect. Some weaker developers were forced to 
get out of the m a r k e t . This created a more valuable 
opportunity for strong developers who are not affected by 
these measures to find better site at a more reasonable 
p r i c e . M o r e o v e r , it arouses the awareness of investors to 
choose strong developers who have good support from banks 
or sound financial background. 
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Second austerity measures only have very minor effect 
on t h e property m a r k e t because of the different reaction of 
local g o v e r n m e n t and strong opposition from the m a r k e t . 
A s a result, the austerity measures help to have a 
m o r e h e a l t h y growth of property market in China by 
screening out the financially weaker developers. It makes 
town p l a n n i n g more properly carried out and attracts the 
attention of public to have the needs of more proper laws 
and r e g u l a t i o n to govern and control the property m a r k e t . 
A u s t e r i t y measures repeat the cycle of other economic 
p o l i c i e s of PRC. Central government loosens the control at 
the very beginning in order to stimulate the economic 
d e v e l o p m e n t . As the economy grows so rapidly, central 
g o v e r n m e n t tries to tighten the control. This creates a 
period of confusion to investors who as a result, retreat 
from their investment. Then unavoidably, central 
g o v e r n m e n t has to loosen the policy again. This cycle 
repeats and repeats in China‘s history and in different 
sectors of the economy. These unstable policies always 
frighten the investors. Therefore, a more stable and long 
term p o l i c i e s are essential to the success of PRC's 
economic growth and development of property m a r k e t . 
In conclusion, China's property market does have her 
p o t e n t i a l and good prospect with the following reasons. 
Firstly, the austerity measures have some cooling effect on 
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the over-heated economy of China and make the market 
develop more h e a l t h y . Secondly, the screening effect not 
only distinguish some weak developers but also helps to 
identify where the market is mature enough to develop and 
w h e r e is n o t . 
T h i r d l y , the return on property development in China 
is still very attractive. Rental yield ranges from 15% to 
33% in major cities. Comparing to the mortgage rate of 
8.5% to 10% for property in China, the return is in high 
side. Table 2 illustrates rental yield of property market 
in some major cities. 
F ourthly, the interest rate for idle fund is still at 
a low level, with normal saving rate of 2%. With double 
digit of inflation rate in Hong Kong, investors have to 
find w a y to utilize their capital. The attractive rate of 
return in China's property market of course attracts the 
capital of investors. 
H o w e v e r , the future development of property market in 
China is still seriously affected by the political 
atmosphere of China and her economic development. If this 
factor is stable, the market is very promising especially 
in some major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou 
and Shenzhen. A good system of laws and regulations is 
urgently required to facilitate the growth and development. 
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TABLE 2 
RENTAL YIELD OF PROPERTY MARKET IN SELECTED MAJOR CITIES 
AS AT MARCH 1994 
(IN USD) 
Cities Property Type Selling P r i ce“ Annual Rental Rental Yield 
(per sq. meter) (per sq. meter) 
Beijing 一 Resident 3,000 - 3,300 500 - 600 17% - 18% 
Beijing Commercial 3,500 - 3,800 900 - 1200 25% - 30% 
S j ^ h a i R e s i d e n t 2,300 - 3,000 450 - 500 16% - 20% 
S h a n g h a i “ C o m m e r c i a l 2,800 - 3,000 750 - 1000 25% - 33% 
Guangzhou Resident 2,000 300 - 350 15% - 17.5% 
Guangzhou Commercial 3,500 - 3,600 800 - 1,050 22.5% - 3 0 % ~ 
Source: interview with Mr. Edward Cheung in C Y Leung Limited 
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Another golden opportunity for developers in future is 
to develop the property market for local investors who have 
really the p o t e n t i a l . The huge population and increasingly 
w e a l t h y families create the strong demand for property. 
Further development of this market should be explored. 
H o w e v e r , the PRC property m a r k e t illustrates that the 
central government is difficult to implement their own 
economic p o l i c i e s . The extent of control is very w e a k . It 
is partially due to the too much decentralization. 
M o r e o v e r , there are no proper systems such as banking and 
accounting to facilitate the implementation of central 
p o l i c i e s . We can contrast this with other Western 
governments which have better systems to implement their 
central p o l i c i e s . Central control is thus stronger. 
Different levels of government have their responsibilities 
and authorities well defined. 
Facing these circumstances, central government may 
implement their policies not only by administrative 
measures but also by monetary instruments such as control 
of money supply, allocation of credit. This may be 
effective because this is determined by the m a r k e t economy 
instead of forcing measures. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , China is fortunate that she is aware of 
her administrative demerits like no sufficient and 
efficient supporting functions and systems。 She does not 
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rely too much on the invisible hand and m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m . 
She only applies the concept with m o d i f i c a t i o n . Otherwise, 
she may repeat the steps of U . S . S . R . and accelerate her own 
d e c l i n e . 
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